“Yes, from the paper "A first-digit anomaly in the 2009 Iranian presidential election" (https://arxiv.org/pdf/0906.2789.pdf): "The total numbers of votes per voting area in the MOI’s data vary from about 10^4 to 10^6, i.e. by two orders of magnitude (powers of 10). This suggests that Benford’s Law may be applicable" The issue, as I understand it, is that…”
A first-digit anomaly in the 2009 Iranian presidential election
A local bootstrap method is proposed for the analysis of electoral vote-count first-digit frequencies, complementing the Benford's Law limit. The method is calibrated on five presidential-election first rounds (2002--2006) and applied to the 2009 Iranian presidential-election first round. Candidate K has a highly significant (p< 0.15%) excess of vote counts starting with the digit 7. This leads to other anomalies, two of which are individually significant at p\sim 0.1%, and one at p\sim 1%. Independently, Iranian pre-election opinion polls significantly reject the official results unless the five polls favouring candidate A are considered alone. If the latter represent normalised data and a linear, least-squares, equal-weighted fit is used, then either candidates R and K suffered a sudden, dramatic (70%\pm 15%) loss of electoral support just prior to the election, or the official results are rejected (p\sim 0.01%).
候选层:至少 2 个不同的人、在 2 个不同月份提到过,还没到主书架的 3 人 3 个月。没有做立场标注,所以只写“被提及”。
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