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安全、隐私与密码学›侧信道与硬件攻击·arXiv:1803.03422 · cs.CR

MOSQUITO: Covert Ultrasonic Transmissions between Two Air-Gapped Computers using Speaker-to-Speaker Communication

Mordechai Guri, Yosef Solewicz, Andrey Daidakulov, Yuval Elovici · 2018
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被提及 · 2 人首次 2023-04-04 · 最近 2025-07-22
2不同的人
2活跃月份
1讨论串
78被引(OpenAlex)
arXiv 摘要(候选层不写导读)

In this paper we show how two (or more) airgapped computers in the same room, equipped with passive speakers, headphones, or earphones can covertly exchange data via ultrasonic waves. Microphones are not required. Our method is based on the capability of a malware to exploit a specific audio chip feature in order to reverse the connected speakers from output devices into input devices - unobtrusively rendering them microphones. We discuss the attack model and provide technical background and implementation details. We show that although the reversed speakers/headphones/earphones were not originally designed to perform as microphones, they still respond well to the near-ultrasonic range (18kHz to 24kHz). We evaluate the communication channel with different equipment, and at various distances and transmission speeds, and also discuss some practical considerations. Our results show that the speaker-to-speaker communication can be used to covertly transmit data between two air-gapped computers positioned a maximum of nine meters away from one another. Moreover, we show that two (microphone-less) headphones can exchange data from a distance of three meters apart. This enables 'headphones-to-headphones' covert communication, which is discussed for the first time in this paper.

候选层:至少 2 个不同的人、在 2 个不同月份提到过,还没到主书架的 3 人 3 个月。没有做立场标注,所以只写“被提及”。

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评论Grothendank · 2023-04

“Here's my basic position: 1. The risk and threats are published 2. The audits I've seen don't evaluate the threats 3. Link me to the audits if you want to convince me I. The risks - airgapping is not enough 1. If the software has zeroday beacons in it, it can communicate with zeroday beacon repeaters embedded in VM, OS, or hardware (see: cache side c…”

评论Cthulhu_ · 2025-07

“Not unheard of, there was a paper about doing keylogging through the tiny EM fluctuations from a computer's power supply for example: https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10197022 Or data exfiltration through fan noise (60 bits/min): https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0167404820300080 Or data transfer between computers using only spe…”

AI comes up with bizarre physics experiments, but they work原评论 ↗