“https://arxiv.org/pdf/2103.02282.pdf, see 6.1: "The BLE advertisements sent out by a lost device contain an EC public key pi. A finder device that receives such an advertisement determinesits current location and encrypts the location with pi.”
Who Can Find My Devices? Security and Privacy of Apple's Crowd-Sourced Bluetooth Location Tracking System
Overnight, Apple has turned its hundreds-of-million-device ecosystem into the world's largest crowd-sourced location tracking network called offline finding (OF). OF leverages online finder devices to detect the presence of missing offline devices using Bluetooth and report an approximate location back to the owner via the Internet. While OF is not the first system of its kind, it is the first to commit to strong privacy goals. In particular, OF aims to ensure finder anonymity, untrackability of owner devices, and confidentiality of location reports. This paper presents the first comprehensive security and privacy analysis of OF. To this end, we recover the specifications of the closed-source OF protocols by means of reverse engineering. We experimentally show that unauthorized access to the location reports allows for accurate device tracking and retrieving a user's top locations with an error in the order of 10 meters in urban areas. While we find that OF's design achieves its privacy goals, we discover two distinct design and implementation flaws that can lead to a location correlation attack and unauthorized access to the location history of the past seven days, which could deanonymize users. Apple has partially addressed the issues following our responsible disclosure. Finally, we make our research artifacts publicly available.
候选层:至少 2 个不同的人、在 2 个不同月份提到过,还没到主书架的 3 人 3 个月。没有做立场标注,所以只写“被提及”。
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推荐在前,同类按时间 · 每篇最多保留 20 条,统计用全部提及“Here’s a detailed protocol reverse engineering paper: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2103.02282.pdf My guess would be that you, as the tag owner, locally store the master beacon key and can use it to derive key required to decrypt received beacon payloads for your own tags. You can then filter out your own and approximate how many others (which you cannot link ov…”
- Who Can Find My Devices? Security and Privacy of Apple's Bluetooth Tracking ↗secfirstmd · 2021-03-04 · 4 分
- Security and Privacy of Apple's Crowd-Sourced Location Tracking System ↗SEJeff · 2021-03-15 · 1 分
- Security and Privacy of Apple's Crowd-Sourced Bluetooth Location Tracking System ↗curmudgeon22 · 2021-03-16 · 2 分
- Who Can Find My Devices? Apple Crowd-Sourced Location Tracking: Security,Privacy ↗FabHK · 2021-03-18 · 2 分
- Security and Privacy of Apple’s Crowd-Sourced Bluetooth Location Tracking System ↗helloworld653 · 2021-04-08 · 2 分
- Apple “Find My” used to track offline devices ↗nilsjansen · 2021-04-19 · 1 分