按年被提到
20222023 · 2 次2026
系统、数据库与网络›互联网协议与匿名网络·arXiv:2204.05122 · cs.CR

Measuring and Mitigating the Risk of IP Reuse on Public Clouds

Eric Pauley, Ryan Sheatsley, Blaine Hoak, Quinn Burke, Yohan Beugin, Patrick McDaniel · 2022
开始阅读 ↗PDFalphaXiv 讨论
被提及 · 2 人首次 2022-04-15 · 最近 2025-01-22
2不同的人
3活跃月份
4讨论串
15被引(OpenAlex)
arXiv 摘要(候选层不写导读)

Public clouds provide scalable and cost-efficient computing through resource sharing. However, moving from traditional on-premises service management to clouds introduces new challenges; failure to correctly provision, maintain, or decommission elastic services can lead to functional failure and vulnerability to attack. In this paper, we explore a broad class of attacks on clouds which we refer to as cloud squatting. In a cloud squatting attack, an adversary allocates resources in the cloud (e.g., IP addresses) and thereafter leverages latent configuration to exploit prior tenants. To measure and categorize cloud squatting we deployed a custom Internet telescope within the Amazon Web Services us-east-1 region. Using this apparatus, we deployed over 3 million servers receiving 1.5 million unique IP addresses (56% of the available pool) over 101 days beginning in March of 2021. We identified 4 classes of cloud services, 7 classes of third-party services, and DNS as sources of exploitable latent configurations. We discovered that exploitable configurations were both common and in many cases extremely dangerous; we received over 5 million cloud messages, many containing sensitive data such as financial transactions, GPS location, and PII. Within the 7 classes of third-party services, we identified dozens of exploitable software systems spanning hundreds of servers (e.g., databases, caches, mobile applications, and web services). Lastly, we identified 5446 exploitable domains spanning 231 eTLDs-including 105 in the top 10,000 and 23 in the top 1000 popular domains. Through tenant disclosures we have identified several root causes, including (a) a lack of organizational controls, (b) poor service hygiene, and (c) failure to follow best practices. We conclude with a discussion of the space of possible mitigations and describe the mitigations to be deployed by Amazon in response to this study.

候选层:至少 2 个不同的人、在 2 个不同月份提到过,还没到主书架的 3 人 3 个月。没有做立场标注,所以只写“被提及”。

HN 书评

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评论ericpauley · 2023-01

“Security vulnerabilities due to resource reuse (subdomain takeover is just one example of this) are rampant and readily exploitable for tons of major companies, especially as cloud providers and SaaS often overlook these as being client responsibilities. Shameless plug, I’ve worked on identifying/characterizing these issues on cloud providers: https://ar…”

Microsoft Subdomain Takeover原评论 ↗
评论ericpauley · 2025-01

“I'll chime in here as this is (very) related to my research. This instance of openly-registerable nameservers is just one (relatively rare) subset of a wide class of dangling DNS issues [1]. Much more common is direct mapping of names to IP addresses on cloud providers that can be obtained by attackers [2][3]. Because of the scope and lack of global vis…”

Mastercard DNS error went unnoticed for years原评论 ↗
被提交为 story · 2 次