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AI 安全、伦理与社会影响›智能体安全与滥用·arXiv:2507.00631 · cs.GT

A Protocol for Trustless Verification Under Uncertainty

David Shi, Kevin Joo · 2025
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被提及 · 2 人首次 2025-07-15 · 最近 2026-02-13
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2活跃月份
2讨论串
0被引(OpenAlex)
arXiv 摘要(候选层不写导读)

Correctness is an emergent property of systems where exposing error is cheaper than committing it. In dynamic, low-trust environments, autonomous AI agents benefit from delegating work to sub-agents, yet correctness cannot be assured through upfront specification or centralized oversight. We propose a protocol that enforces correctness through collateralized claims in a recursive verification game. Tasks are published as intents, and solvers compete to fulfill them. Selected solvers carry out tasks under risk, with correctness checked post hoc by verifiers. Any challenger can challenge a result by staking against it to trigger the verification process. Incorrect agents are slashed and correct opposition is rewarded, with an escalation path that penalizes erroneous verifiers themselves. When incentives are aligned across solvers, challengers, and verifiers, falsification conditions make correctness the Nash equilibrium.

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