“tldr: 1) LTE uses broadcast messages to do push notifications. These are unencrypted and unauthenticated. Researchers can trigger them silently by spamming you on Facebook, and triangulate your location since the LTE network only sends the pages to the geographic location you are in. 2) LTE supports crash reports that can potentially include your GPS co…”
Practical Attacks Against Privacy and Availability in 4G/LTE Mobile Communication Systems
Mobile communication systems now constitute an essential part of life throughout the world. Fourth generation "Long Term Evolution" (LTE) mobile communication networks are being deployed. The LTE suite of specifications is considered to be significantly better than its predecessors not only in terms of functionality but also with respect to security and privacy for subscribers. We carefully analyzed LTE access network protocol specifications and uncovered several vulnerabilities. Using commercial LTE mobile devices in real LTE networks, we demonstrate inexpensive, and practical attacks exploiting these vulnerabilities. Our first class of attacks consists of three different ways of making an LTE device leak its location: A semi-passive attacker can locate an LTE device within a 2 sq.km area within a city whereas an active attacker can precisely locate an LTE device using GPS co-ordinates or trilateration via cell-tower signal strength information. Our second class of attacks can persistently deny some or all services to a target LTE device. To the best of our knowledge, our work constitutes the first publicly reported practical attacks against LTE access network protocols. We present several countermeasures to resist our specific attacks. We also discuss possible trade-offs that may explain why these vulnerabilities exist and recommend that safety margins introduced into future specifications to address such trade-offs should incorporate greater agility to accommodate subsequent changes in the trade-off equilibrium.
候选层:至少 2 个不同的人、在 2 个不同月份提到过,还没到主书架的 3 人 3 个月。没有做立场标注,所以只写“被提及”。
HN 书评
推荐在前,同类按时间 · 每篇最多保留 20 条,统计用全部提及“This floated through my Twitter stream yesterday (I think via @thegrugg) - as I was reading it I kept thinking "Really? Is there even a vaguely plausible explanation for that choice of leaving a command message unencrypted and unauthenticated that doesn't boil down to 'so the NSA or other LEO can exploit it'?" http://arxiv.org/pdf/1510.07563v1.pdf "Prac…”
“* GSM (2g) does not have authentication at all. * 3G has no integrity protection. Downgrade attacks from 3G->2G work. Also, it's the base station who decides if authentication and encryption is done. Fake base stations can still be used to track location, intercept calls and data. * LTE/4G has mutual authentication and mandatory integrity protection. In…”
- Practical attacks against privacy and availability in 4G/LTE systems ↗sohkamyung · 2015-10-28 · 2 分