“Damning conclusions in TFP. https://arxiv.org/pdf/2009.09035.pdf "In addition, law enforcement has long demanded backdoor access to private user devices and user data [61]. We do not believe that users of PGPP, in its current form, would be capable of withstanding targeted legal or extra-legal attacks by nation-state organizations (e.g., the FBI or NSA)"…”
Pretty Good Phone Privacy
To receive service in today's cellular architecture, phones uniquely identify themselves to towers and thus to operators. This is now a cause of major privacy violations, as operators now sell and leak identity and location data of hundreds of millions of mobile users. In this paper, we take an end-to-end perspective on the cellular architecture and find key points of decoupling that enable us to protect user identity and location privacy with no changes to physical infrastructure, no added latency, and no requirement of direct cooperation from existing operators. We describe Pretty Good Phone Privacy (PGPP) and demonstrate how our modified backend stack (NGC) works with real phones to provide ordinary yet privacy-preserving connectivity. We explore inherent privacy and efficiency tradeoffs in a simulation of a large metropolitan region. We show how PGPP maintains today's control overheads while significantly improving user identity and location privacy.
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推荐在前,同类按时间 · 每篇最多保留 20 条,统计用全部提及- Pretty Good Phone Privacy: end-to-end perspective on the cellular architecture ↗giuliomagnifico · 2021-08-13 · 1 分