按年被提到
20182018 · 3 次2026
安全、隐私与密码学›侧信道与硬件攻击·arXiv:1805.09604 · cs.CR

SEVered: Subverting AMD's Virtual Machine Encryption

Mathias Morbitzer, Manuel Huber, Julian Horsch, Sascha Wessel · 2018
开始阅读 ↗PDFalphaXiv 讨论
被提及 · 4 人首次 2018-05-26 · 最近 2020-06-09
4不同的人
2活跃月份
4讨论串
77被引(OpenAlex)
arXiv 摘要(候选层不写导读)

AMD SEV is a hardware feature designed for the secure encryption of virtual machines. SEV aims to protect virtual machine memory not only from other malicious guests and physical attackers, but also from a possibly malicious hypervisor. This relieves cloud and virtual server customers from fully trusting their server providers and the hypervisors they are using. We present the design and implementation of SEVered, an attack from a malicious hypervisor capable of extracting the full contents of main memory in plaintext from SEV-encrypted virtual machines. SEVered neither requires physical access nor colluding virtual machines, but only relies on a remote communication service, such as a web server, running in the targeted virtual machine. We verify the effectiveness of SEVered on a recent AMD SEV-enabled server platform running different services, such as web or SSH servers, in encrypted virtual machines. With these examples, we demonstrate that SEVered reliably and efficiently extracts all memory contents even in scenarios where the targeted virtual machine is under high load.

候选层:至少 2 个不同的人、在 2 个不同月份提到过,还没到主书架的 3 人 3 个月。没有做立场标注,所以只写“被提及”。

HN 书评

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评论ENOTTY · 2020-06

“SEV has been subjected to its own share of attacks (and design/implementation fails), but note that it has a different threat model. * https://arxiv.org/pdf/1712.05090.pdf 2017 * https://arxiv.org/pdf/1612.01119.pdf 2017 * https://arxiv.org/pdf/1805.09604.pdf 2018 * https://ipads.se.sjtu.edu.cn/_media/publications/fidelius_hpca18.pdf 2018 * https://s…”

How SGX Fails in Practice原评论 ↗
被提交为 story · 3 次