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安全、隐私与密码学›侧信道与硬件攻击·arXiv:1902.05178 · cs.PL

Spectre is here to stay: An analysis of side-channels and speculative execution

Spectre 会长期存在:侧信道与推测执行分析
Ross Mcilroy, Jaroslav Sevcik, Tobias Tebbi, Ben L. Titzer, Toon Verwaest · 2019

论证 Spectre 无法在软件层彻底修复,须靠进程隔离

开始阅读 ↗PDFalphaXiv 讨论
被推荐 · 15 人首次 2019-02-15 · 最近 2023-08-13
15不同的人
14活跃月份
18讨论串
101被引(OpenAlex)

从编程语言角度分析推测执行侧信道攻击:这些信道并非单纯的缺陷,而是处于优化的根基之中。论文给出侧信道的数学元模型和带推测语义的体系结构模型,评估软件缓解措施并证明其中一种在该模型中是正确的。基于 V8 的攻防经验,作者认为现有硬件上的推测漏洞会击溃所有由语言保证的机密性,不受信任的代码可构造通用读取 gadget,通过侧信道读取同一地址空间的全部内存,因此 Chrome 和 V8 已转向进程隔离的安全模型。

HN 为什么提它

评论者把它当作 Spectre 无法在软件层面彻底缓解的权威论据,用来说明浏览器必须依赖进程或站点隔离,并有作者本人现身引用其结论。

实证研究难度 4 / 5约 90 分钟经得起时间
读之前最好知道
1CPU 微架构与推测执行(speculative execution)
2缓存时序侧信道
3JavaScript 虚拟机(V8)与沙箱
4进程隔离与同源模型

学习路径

读这篇之前,按顺序读书架上的 2 篇 · 参考文献来自 OpenAlex,顺序和要点由 Claude Code 排出

候选里与 Spectre 直接相关的是推测执行缓冲区溢出攻击,以及展示软件可诱发硬件故障的 Rowhammer.js;气隙隔离类论文不选。

  1. 1
    Rowhammer.js: A Remote Software-Induced Fault Attack in JavaScriptRowhammer.js:JavaScript 中的远程软件诱发故障攻击 · 2015

    展示了仅靠网页 JavaScript 就能利用微架构特性发起硬件级攻击,与 Spectre 的浏览器威胁相呼应。

    读抓攻击如何在 JavaScript 里实现,以及硬件优化与安全冲突的论点。

  2. 2

    直接讨论推测执行下的缓冲区溢出攻击与软件防御,是 Spectre 软件缓解的前身。

    读读攻击机制与提出的防御方案,注意它们的局限。

  3. 3
    Spectre is here to stay: An analysis of side-channels and speculative executionSpectre 会长期存在:侧信道与推测执行分析 · 2019 · 就是这篇

    论证侧信道源于优化本身,软件层无法彻底修复,需靠进程隔离。

    读重点读三个开放问题:发现侧信道、理解推测漏洞、缓解,以及形式化的元模型。

HN 书评

推荐在前,同类按时间 · 每篇最多保留 20 条,统计用全部提及
推荐guiambros · 2019-02

“Worth reading the paper [1].”

推荐读这篇论文
Google Says Spectre and Meltdown Are Too Difficult to Fix原评论 ↗
推荐vectorEQ · 2019-12

“This paper might be of interest:”

推荐它,解释推测执行侧信道为何难以抽象,比 Spectre 论文简单
C Is Not a Low-level Language (2018)原评论 ↗
推荐ddworken · 2021-03

“Last year Chrome published a great paper on this[1].”

推荐 Chrome 的论文,说明 Spectre 无法完全防住
A Spectre proof-of-concept for a Spectre-proof web原评论 ↗
引用Tepix · 2019-03

“It seems only hardware fixes actually work: Spectre is here to stay”

引用它,认为似乎只有硬件修复才真正有效
Why OpenBSD Rocks原评论 ↗
引用benol · 2019-03

“Considering the recent "Spectre is here to stay" paper [1], can anyone comment on whether Firefox should be considered secure”

借这篇论文询问 Firefox 是否还能算安全
Firefox 66.0 Aims to Reduce Online Annoyances原评论 ↗
引用magicalhippo · 2019-04

“I note the year of the article, which was before Spectre and friends showed that this is not a reasonable assumption these days[1].”

指出文章成文早于 Spectre,该假设如今已不成立
Lisp Operating System (2015)原评论 ↗
看全部 18 条 →
引用tntn · 2019-06

“, so the only protection you get is from process isolation”

引用它说明只有进程隔离才能提供保护
WebAssembly on the Server: How System Calls Work原评论 ↗
引用the_why_of_y · 2019-07

“on modern out-of-order CPUs due to Spectre [2].”

引用它说明在乱序 CPU 上 Spectre 使纯软件隔离失效
Inferno Operating System原评论 ↗
引用rrss · 2019-09

“Anyway, thread isolation already doesn't work even without hyperthreading-specific attacks”

说明即便没有超线程攻击,线程隔离也已失效
OpenBSD was right to disable hyperthreading [video]原评论 ↗
引用comex · 2019-10

“Both vendors’ processors are still vulnerable to Spectre attacks even with mitigations applied [1]”

引用它说明两家厂商处理器即便打了缓解仍受 Spectre 攻击
AMD Rome – is it for real? Architecture and initial HPC performance原评论 ↗
引用titzer · 2020-07

“I worked on Spectre for almost two years while at Google. We wrote this:”

自称在谷歌研究 Spectre 近两年,并贴出所写的这篇论文
WasmBoxC: Simple, Fast, and VM-Less Sandboxing原评论 ↗
引用ENOTTY · 2020-12

“AMD, ARM, Intel, and IBM are all affected by Spectre (Bounds Check Bypass)”

指出 AMD、ARM、Intel、IBM 都受 Spectre 影响
M1 Macs: Truth and Truthiness原评论 ↗
引用titzer · 2021-03

“This is the conclusion of our 2019 paper:”

引用自己这篇 2019 年论文的结论
Post-Spectre Web Development, Editor's Draft, 2021-03-10原评论 ↗
引用ddworken · 2021-03

“See this[1] paper for more information.”

让人看这篇论文了解更多
A Spectre proof-of-concept for a Spectre-proof web原评论 ↗
引用ddworken · 2021-03

“If you're curious, see the paper "Spectre is here to stay: An analysis of side-channels and speculative execution" [0].”

推荐好奇的人去读,说明为何 CPU 层面无法修复这类侧信道
Linus Torvalds on where Rust will fit into Linux原评论 ↗
引用jssmith · 2021-10

“An analysis of Spectre and software isolation is here:”

贴出论文,提供对 Spectre 与软件隔离的分析
Singularity – Microsoft’s Experimental OS原评论 ↗
引用titzer · 2022-03

“We wrote a whole paper about it a few years back.”

称自己团队为此写过整篇论文
The wild world of non-C operating systems原评论 ↗
引用sweetjuly · 2023-08

“a bunch of people at Google who worked on the mitigation in Chromium wrote a paper [2] saying as much”

指出 Chromium 缓解团队的论文也认为限制计时无效,需站点隔离
Sandy Bridge: Setting Intel’s Modern Foundation原评论 ↗
被提交为 story · 1 次