“Coincidentally, there is a paper and talk about this called:”
Flash Boys 2.0: Frontrunning, Transaction Reordering, and Consensus Instability in Decentralized Exchanges
记录并量化去中心化交易所上的套利机器人与矿工可提取价值(MEV)
论文记录并量化了区块链去中心化交易所中套利机器人的广泛且不断增加的部署,这些机器人像华尔街的高频交易者一样,支付高额手续费并优化网络延迟来抢先交易普通用户。作者研究了机器人的盈利策略,发现它们通过优先 gas 拍卖(PGA)竞价抬高手续费以获得靠前的区块位置,并将其形式化为连续时间、部分信息的博弈模型,同时发布了实时数据门户。论文还指出为优先排序支付的高额费用对共识层安全构成系统性风险,并提出这属于更一般的现象,即矿工可提取价值(MEV),对以太坊构成现实威胁。
HN 上的人在谈论区块链上的抢先交易、矿工重排交易以及 MEV 时反复引用它,作为这些现象的原始研究。
学习路径
读这篇之前,按顺序读书架上的 1 篇 · 参考文献来自 OpenAlex,顺序和要点由 Claude Code 排出候选里只有共识协议方面的论文,其中自私挖矿与目标论文里矿工操纵交易顺序的分析最接近,其余并不直接相关。
- 1
说明矿工可偏离诚实行为获取超额收益,与矿工重排交易的动机相通
读自私挖矿策略与收益的分析,理解矿工激励如何破坏共识稳定
- 2Flash Boys 2.0: Frontrunning, Transaction Reordering, and Consensus Instability in Decentralized Exchanges
目标论文:量化去中心化交易所上的套利机器人与矿工可提取价值
读抢先交易与手续费竞拍的观察,以及对共识稳定性的影响
HN 书评
推荐在前,同类按时间 · 每篇最多保留 20 条,统计用全部提及“This one isn't an attack per se, it is mostly an exploration of arbitrage bots in decentralized exchanges running on Ethereum smart contracts.”
“This paper [1] dives into detail about how these arbitrage mechanics play out on the blockchain”
“It gets even funnier when you consider that miners may reorder transactions they include in a block as they see fit, and even add their own transactions to front-run others.”
“merge mining on Bitcoin[0] and MEV on Ethereum[1] are evidence against that argument, since we already have those forces in play today.”
“exposure to something called MEV[1]”
- Flash Boys 2.0 ↗simonebrunozzi · 2020-08-29 · 1 分
- Frontrunning, Tx Reordering and Consensus Instability in Decentralized Exchanges ↗runeks · 2020-09-07 · 1 分
- Flash Boys 2: Frontrunning, transaction reordering, consensus instability (2019) ↗lawrenceyan · 2022-05-06 · 146 分