按年被提到
20192019 · 1 次2026
系统、数据库与网络›互联网协议与匿名网络·arXiv:1906.09682 · cs.CR

Encrypted DNS --> Privacy? A Traffic Analysis Perspective

Sandra Siby, Marc Juarez, Claudia Diaz, Narseo Vallina-Rodriguez, Carmela Troncoso · 2019
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被提及 · 2 人首次 2019-06-25 · 最近 2020-12-05
2不同的人
2活跃月份
2讨论串
125被引(OpenAlex)
arXiv 摘要(候选层不写导读)

Virtually every connection to an Internet service is preceded by a DNS lookup which is performed without any traffic-level protection, thus enabling manipulation, redirection, surveillance, and censorship. To address these issues, large organizations such as Google and Cloudflare are deploying recently standardized protocols that encrypt DNS traffic between end users and recursive resolvers such as DNS-over-TLS (DoT) and DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH). In this paper, we examine whether encrypting DNS traffic can protect users from traffic analysis-based monitoring and censoring. We propose a novel feature set to perform the attacks, as those used to attack HTTPS or Tor traffic are not suitable for DNS' characteristics. We show that traffic analysis enables the identification of domains with high accuracy in closed and open world settings, using 124 times less data than attacks on HTTPS flows. We find that factors such as location, resolver, platform, or client do mitigate the attacks performance but they are far from completely stopping them. Our results indicate that DNS-based censorship is still possible on encrypted DNS traffic. In fact, we demonstrate that the standardized padding schemes are not effective. Yet, Tor -- which does not effectively mitigate traffic analysis attacks on web traffic -- is a good defense against DoH traffic analysis.

候选层:至少 2 个不同的人、在 2 个不同月份提到过,还没到主书架的 3 人 3 个月。没有做立场标注,所以只写“被提及”。

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