推荐Sephr · 2017-04
“are good starting points, though they are not very accessible to a layman.”
推荐作为 JavaScript 缓存时序攻击的入门,但对外行不友好
首个完全在浏览器中运行的微架构侧信道缓存攻击
论文提出首个完全在浏览器内运行的微架构侧信道攻击:受害者只需访问一个含攻击者内容的不可信网页,无需安装任何软件。该攻击扩展了 Yarom 等人的末级缓存(LLC)攻击,可让远程攻击者恢复同一物理主机上其他进程、其他用户乃至其他虚拟机的信息。作者给出攻击原理,用高带宽隐蔽信道评估性能,并用它构建了系统级的鼠标与网络活动记录器;防御虽然可行,但对正常的网页和计算机使用代价过高。
HN 上的人把它当作“网页里的 JavaScript 也能发动缓存计时侧信道攻击”的代表例子,讨论浏览器计时 API 的风险,同时提醒它对外行不太容易读。
“are good starting points, though they are not very accessible to a layman.”
“Even then, the Rust implementation may not be immune to DRAM rowhammer attacks or side-channel attacks, like how The Spy in the Sandbox -- Practical Cache Attacks in Javascript used Javascript.”
“Further reading on some of the exciting new timing attacks added to web standards in recent years:”