“I never really understood why just placing the equivalent of `wait(GetRandom())` isn't an efficient way to block timing attacks”
Robust and Efficient Elimination of Cache and Timing Side Channels
Timing and cache side channels provide powerful attacks against many sensitive operations including cryptographic implementations. Existing defenses cannot protect against all classes of such attacks without incurring prohibitive performance overhead. A popular strategy for defending against all classes of these attacks is to modify the implementation so that the timing and cache access patterns of every hardware instruction is independent of the secret inputs. However, this solution is architecture-specific, brittle, and difficult to get right. In this paper, we propose and evaluate a robust low-overhead technique for mitigating timing and cache channels. Our solution requires only minimal source code changes and works across multiple languages/platforms. We report the experimental results of applying our solution to protect several C, C++, and Java programs. Our results demonstrate that our solution successfully eliminates the timing and cache side-channel leaks while incurring significantly lower performance overhead than existing approaches.
候选层:至少 2 个不同的人、在 2 个不同月份提到过,还没到主书架的 3 人 3 个月。没有做立场标注,所以只写“被提及”。
HN 书评
没有评论直接链到它;下面是它被提交的讨论串里回复最多的评论(不计入统计)“Wow, this is incredible. Great work and an out-of-the-box and obvious-in-hindsight solution. The performance numbers are inspiring. Will be interesting to see crypt-analysis that attempts to break a solution like this.”
“This reads as if a poisoned CPU cache can indeed leak secrets and has been known for many years now? Am I reading that right?”
- Robust and Efficient Elimination of Cache and Timing Side Channels ↗luu · 2015-06-08 · 35 分
- Robust and Efficient Elimination of Cache and Timing Side Channels [pdf] ↗jasonmp85 · 2015-06-08 · 1 分
- Robust and Efficient Elimination of Cache and Timing Side Channels (2015) ↗KirinDave · 2018-01-06 · 55 分