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安全、隐私与密码学›侧信道与硬件攻击·arXiv:1807.03757 · cs.CR

Speculative Buffer Overflows: Attacks and Defenses

Vladimir Kiriansky, Carl Waldspurger · 2018
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被提及 · 3 人首次 2018-07-11 · 最近 2020-08-25
3不同的人
2活跃月份
3讨论串
125被引(OpenAlex)
arXiv 摘要(候选层不写导读)

Practical attacks that exploit speculative execution can leak confidential information via microarchitectural side channels. The recently-demonstrated Spectre attacks leverage speculative loads which circumvent access checks to read memory-resident secrets, transmitting them to an attacker using cache timing or other covert communication channels. We introduce Spectre1.1, a new Spectre-v1 variant that leverages speculative stores to create speculative buffer overflows. Much like classic buffer overflows, speculative out-of-bounds stores can modify data and code pointers. Data-value attacks can bypass some Spectre-v1 mitigations, either directly or by redirecting control flow. Control-flow attacks enable arbitrary speculative code execution, which can bypass fence instructions and all other software mitigations for previous speculative-execution attacks. It is easy to construct return-oriented-programming (ROP) gadgets that can be used to build alternative attack payloads. We also present Spectre1.2: on CPUs that do not enforce read/write protections, speculative stores can overwrite read-only data and code pointers to breach sandboxes. We highlight new risks posed by these vulnerabilities, discuss possible software mitigations, and sketch microarchitectural mechanisms that could serve as hardware defenses. We have not yet evaluated the performance impact of our proposed software and hardware mitigations. We describe the salient vulnerability features and additional hypothetical attack scenarios only to the detail necessary to guide hardware and software vendors in threat analysis and mitigations. We advise users to refer to more user-friendly vendor recommendations for mitigations against speculative buffer overflows or available patches.

候选层:至少 2 个不同的人、在 2 个不同月份提到过,还没到主书架的 3 人 3 个月。没有做立场标注,所以只写“被提及”。

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评论pfraze · 2020-08

“Guy's arguing that there are still benefits to applying security boundaries within execution envs which are vulnerable to spectre memory reads since it would limit the ability to exfiltrate. (There was a variant which could write to memory as well [1].) There was some discussion on twitter about this which I found interesting [2]. 1 https://arxiv.org/abs…”

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