按年被提到
20162016 · 1 次2026
安全、隐私与密码学›侧信道与硬件攻击·arXiv:1612.04474 · cs.CR

Your Processor Leaks Information - and There's Nothing You Can Do About It

Qian Ge, Yuval Yarom, Frank Li, Gernot Heiser · 2016
开始阅读 ↗PDFalphaXiv 讨论
被提及 · 2 人首次 2016-12-15 · 最近 2017-01-04
2不同的人
2活跃月份
2讨论串
12被引(OpenAlex)
arXiv 摘要(候选层不写导读)

Timing channels are information flows, encoded in the relative timing of events, that bypass the system's protection mechanisms. Any microarchitectural state that depends on execution history and affects the rate of progress of later executions potentially establishes a timing channel, unless explicit steps are taken to close it. Such state includes CPU caches, TLBs, branch predictors and prefetchers; removing the channels requires that the OS can partition such state or flush it on a switch of security domains. We measure the capacities of channels based on these microarchitectural features on several generations of processors across the two mainstream ISAs, x86 and ARM, and investigate the effectiveness of the flushing mechanisms provided by the respective ISA.We find that in all processors we studied, at least one significant channel remains. This implies that closing all timing channels seems impossible on contemporary mainstream processors.

候选层:至少 2 个不同的人、在 2 个不同月份提到过,还没到主书架的 3 人 3 个月。没有做立场标注,所以只写“被提及”。

HN 书评

没有评论直接链到它;下面是它被提交的讨论串里回复最多的评论(不计入统计)

讨论串里没有 ≥100 字的评论,只有提交记录。

被提交为 story · 2 次