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安全、隐私与密码学›侧信道与硬件攻击·arXiv:1901.08338 · cs.OS

Can We Prove Time Protection?

Gernot Heiser, Gerwin Klein, Toby Murray · 2019
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被提及 · 2 人首次 2019-01-31 · 最近 2021-03-04
2不同的人
2活跃月份
2讨论串
1被引(OpenAlex)
arXiv 摘要(候选层不写导读)

Timing channels are a significant and growing security threat in computer systems, with no established solution. We have recently argued that the OS must provide time protection, in analogy to the established memory protection, to protect applications from information leakage through timing channels. Based on a recently-proposed implementation of time protection in the seL4 microkernel, we investigate how such an implementation could be formally proved to prevent timing channels. We postulate that this should be possible by reasoning about a highly abstracted representation of the shared hardware resources that cause timing channels.

候选层:至少 2 个不同的人、在 2 个不同月份提到过,还没到主书架的 3 人 3 个月。没有做立场标注,所以只写“被提及”。

HN 书评

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评论GregarianChild · 2021-03

“That would be great. But isn't there a danger, that such a CPU, at least if implemented naievely, would basically mostly idle, since modern OoO processors schedule memory access dynamically? For hard real-time tasks, some CPUs don't have caches, to make timing more predictable, but there is a heavy performance penalty to be paid for that predictability. …”

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